Markets often label these incidents as "black swans," but when you zoom out, this round of DeFi losses is better understood as a systemic stress test triggered by a series of shocks, not a one-off accident.
This risk cycle began on April 1, when Drift Protocol suffered a major attack. Multiple on-chain analyses and post-incident reviews show the attacker gained control and introduced fake collateral, extracting roughly $285 million from the protocol. This wiped out more than half its TVL, making it one of the largest DeFi attacks since 2026.
But more importantly, this wasn't an isolated case.
After Drift, the risk didn’t subside—it kept building:
In just 18 days, DeFi’s total losses topped $606 million, with the Drift and Kelp DAO incidents accounting for about 95% of the total.
In other words, this wasn’t about "one protocol failing." Instead, Drift shattered security expectations → Kelp DAO triggered a liquidity collapse → multiple protocols were forced to deleverage → TVL dropped systemically.
If this were just a single-point vulnerability, such a cascade wouldn’t have happened. The real takeaway: these attacks were triggers that exposed deeper systemic weaknesses in DeFi—fragilities that had existed under high leverage, asset reuse, and protocol nesting, but had never been collectively stress-tested.
On the surface, Kelp DAO’s issue seems straightforward: a vulnerability in the cross-chain asset rsETH was exploited, resulting in nearly $300 million lost.
But if you shift perspective from "protocol error" to "structural position," the story changes entirely.
Kelp DAO isn’t an isolated protocol; it sits at the heart of a deeply nested structure:
In short, rsETH isn’t just a simple asset—it’s a "credit vehicle" that’s repeatedly used and amplified across multiple layers.
When this vehicle fails, the impact doesn’t stay within Kelp DAO—it radiates outward through the entire structure.
So, the more accurate statement is:
Kelp DAO isn’t the only problem—it’s just the first breaking point.

Source: DefiLlama
Many see TVL hitting a one-year low and assume "capital is flowing out."
But the reality is more nuanced.
TVL drops are usually driven by three overlapping factors:
That’s why TVL often falls much faster than capital outflows alone would suggest.
In other words, this isn’t just "users withdrawing funds"—it’s the system actively deleveraging.
The most critical takeaway from this episode is the risk transmission path itself.
A typical chain looks like this:
rsETH is used as collateral → enters a lending protocol → is lent out again → used for recursive staking → expands liquidity further via bridges
In normal markets, this boosts capital efficiency.
But under stress, it acts as an amplifier:
Crucially, these steps don’t happen in sequence—they happen all at once. That’s why, under stress, DeFi can resemble a traditional financial "bank run."
From a traditional finance perspective, these events are all too familiar.
Stack these together, and DeFi starts to look a lot like a "shadow banking system."
The core risks of shadow banking are well known:
The Kelp DAO incident was a localized failure that quickly escalated into system-wide volatility.
A $600 million loss isn’t unprecedented in crypto. But the sentiment this time is far more severe.
Why? Because it shakes a key assumption—not just a single protocol:
Is DeFi’s complex structure really under control?
When users start doubting:
The issue isn’t just "lower returns"—it’s "declining trust." And in DeFi, trust is the foundation of liquidity.
Viewed over a longer cycle, this event may mark a turning point: DeFi is shifting from "yield-driven" to "risk-pricing-driven."
Over the past two years, the focus was on:
Now, the market is reassessing:
Several changes are coming:
In effect, this isn’t DeFi’s decline—it’s a "deleveraging" moment.
The Kelp DAO incident is over, but its impact lingers. The TVL drop is just the surface; the deeper shift is the market’s re-evaluation of DeFi’s risk structure.
What matters next isn’t:
But rather:
For DeFi, this shockwave may not end soon. But it’s forcing the industry to confront a fundamental question: In a system without a central bank, lender of last resort, or unified regulation, who ultimately bears the risk? That’s the real issue behind the $600 million loss.





