#美伊局势和谈与增兵博弈 From "using war to promote negotiations" to "using negotiations to stop the war"

From the restart of US-Iran talks announced in early Zhou (although the exact time has not yet been finalized), to the news on Wednesday of a two-week extension of the ceasefire (although both the US and Iran have denied it), the market has already chosen to believe (oil prices continue to fall, global stock markets continue to rebound).
In other words, from the perspective of market expectations, this week is a very important turning point: the US-Iran game shifting from "using war to promote negotiations" to "using negotiations to stop the war"; the stock market moving from a brief rebound window to enjoying a new, longer rebound window; the global real economy shifting from "oil shortage" to "computing power shortage," and then to a multi-faceted inflation. Since the announcement of a temporary ceasefire on April 8 from "using war to promote negotiations," the US has been high-profile in deploying troops to the Middle East, and Israel has been high-profile in bombing Lebanon, creating a typical "using war to promote negotiations" pattern.
The first round of talks in Islamabad on April 11-12 broke down as expected, but unexpectedly, the pattern of "using war to promote negotiations" did not escalate further. Apart from the US imposing a second blockade on the Strait of Hormuz, everything else was relatively calm.
Later, news of the restart of US-Iran negotiations and a two-week extension of the ceasefire emerged. Although not yet finalized or temporarily denied, the rumor has some basis, and the game pattern has quietly shifted to "using negotiations to stop the war." Initially, many believed it was "impossible to reach an agreement" because the core demands of both sides were completely opposed.
But as the ceasefire exceeded a week, more and more people calmed down and saw that in the face of high war costs and sacrifices, if a quick victory was not possible, then "talking" was the rational choice. The US superficially deployed troops in the Middle East as a "delay tactic," but in reality, it could also be "creating leverage for negotiations," threatening the other side that "the consequences of failed negotiations are very serious." Nothing is truly off the table for negotiation; even the initial "using war to promote negotiations" ultimately aims for "talks," right? Being able to sit down and talk indicates both sides prefer to resolve issues through "talk" rather than "war," and both have room for concessions.
It's just that it's still early, and no one is willing to reveal their cards at the start. Even the core conflicts of both sides are fully negotiable. Either exchange conditions for conditions or step back from each other. So, the rumors of the US and Iran restarting negotiations are probably not false, just not yet finalized.
The shift from "using war to promote negotiations" to "using negotiations to stop the war" in the US-Iran game also means that the stock market has transitioned from a brief rebound window to a longer, sustained rebound window. Iran's core demands include four points: uranium enrichment, control of the strait, war reparations, and sanctions relief. Control of the strait concerns the foundation of the petrodollar system and is a core US demand. Uranium enrichment threatens Israel's regional dominance in the Middle East and is a core Israeli demand. Iran has endured decades of sanctions, so lifting sanctions is not an urgent priority. Moreover, after this conflict, the US's hegemonic position will be further challenged, and the power of sanctions itself will weaken significantly. Regarding Iran's war damages, there have been multiple versions this week—some say hundreds of billions of dollars, others say tens of billions—there's a huge discrepancy. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has cleverly avoided being extorted by the US for "protection fees" by aligning itself (purchasing and deploying Chinese military systems, gradually replacing or shedding dependence on US military equipment), so the US is less likely to be as generous on war reparations as before. Therefore, the elasticity of war reparations is high and could become a bargaining chip or concession.
In other words, the "core conflicts" in negotiations are only two: uranium enrichment (between Iran and the US) and control of the strait (between Iran and the US). Previously, everyone only knew that Iran's top leadership was infiltrated like a sieve, but in fact, the US is also infiltrated. Out of 435 Congress members, more than 300 are funded by pro-Israel lobbying groups. It’s not hard to understand why the US repeatedly states that uranium enrichment is a red line in negotiations. It’s also easy to see why Iran keeps mocking the US for becoming Israel’s "seventh administrative district."
So, the final negotiation outcome—whether the US chooses to prioritize one "core conflict" over the other—is really hard to say. As for the rumor of a two-week ceasefire extension, it’s probably half-true and half-false. Extending the ceasefire is necessary for negotiations, but two weeks is too long. The time the US has spent detouring around the Cape of Good Hope is more than the original plan—an extra six days. If the ceasefire is extended by one week, it would be reasonable (by the morning of April 29). The ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel also supports this (a 10-day ceasefire ending by the morning of April 27).
For the US, the extra time is mainly used for detours, and even more time is unnecessary. For Iran, the more time they have, the more blood they can draw—more is better. Whether in terms of military costs or internal and external pressure, the pressure on the US increases rapidly over time. For Iran, it’s just that they cannot export large quantities of oil via shipping temporarily. Time is still on Iran’s side. If the situation drags on, by the end of April, the blockade effect will shift from "rising oil prices" to "physical supply cutoff," and the external pressure on the US could undergo a qualitative change. The high pressure from countries cutting off oil supplies will mostly fall on the instigators and the US, which is implementing the second blockade. In fact, even before the end of the month, more countries are criticizing the US blockade as "illegal," and more commercial ships are starting to "break through" US blockades. Additionally, Iran has taken clever measures: on one hand, proposing to lift the blockade on the Oman side, and on the other, threatening the US with the Red Sea route to lift the blockade. As a result, ships that cannot pass through the Strait of Hormuz blame the US, ships caught in the Red Sea route also blame the US, and external pressure doubles. Therefore, extending the US-Iran ceasefire is reasonable, aligns with both sides' interests, and is likely to be confirmed. But a two-week extension is unlikely, and both sides have denied it.
From "oil shortage" to "computing power shortage," rising oil prices will inevitably lead to widespread inflation, which the market has anticipated, and many related predictions have been made since March. There are even concerns about reduced fertilizer production and supply disruptions leading to a future global food crisis. But what the market did not expect was that inflation would arrive much faster than imagined—from "oil shortage" to "computing power shortage," inflation is now blooming in multiple areas. Many analyses focus on demand-side factors, seemingly avoiding supply-side factors.
In fact, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz greatly impacts computing power costs: helium supply cuts; bromine and photoresist raw materials for chip etching have surged in price; high oil prices significantly increase electricity costs for AI data centers... all these factors sharply raise computing costs, directly causing the rise in computing power prices. It may seem unrelated, but even industries that depend heavily on oil and petrochemicals are affected. For investors, inflation isn’t entirely bad because inflation often benefits the stock market. The reason is simple: as demand becomes tight, the higher the prices companies can charge, the more valuable they are. Besides essential consumer goods, the semiconductor and new energy (automobile) industries are expected to benefit the most. This is why the ChiNext Board has repeatedly hit new highs this year, even surpassing the historical second-highest level in 2021. Oil supply disruptions have lasted over a month, and the chain of inflation transmission has already formed. Even if the Strait of Hormuz reopens immediately, the shipping time plus the time for Middle Eastern oil production to recover will take more than a quarter to normalize. The time to restore inflation will be even longer. So, regardless of whether negotiations succeed or conflict reignites, the logic of inflation remains unchanged, and this high certainty makes it an absolute main theme.