Wu said that Vitalik Buterin stated that Ethereum currently has four types of quantum vulnerabilities: consensus layer BLS signatures, data availability reliance on KZG commitments and proofs, EOA's ECDSA signatures, and application layer ZK proofs based on KZG or Groth16. The proposed approach is to replace them in phases: the consensus layer will substitute BLS with hash-based signatures (such as Winternitz variants) combined with STARK aggregation, while carefully selecting new core hash functions; data availability can migrate from KZG to STARK, but issues such as the 2D DAS linearity and erasure coding proof need to be addressed; EOAs will support arbitrary quantum-resistant signature algorithms through native account abstraction (EIP-8141), combined with vectorized precompiles and protocol-level recursive aggregation to reduce verification costs; application layer proofs will compress extensive verification logic into a small number of on-chain verifications through protocol-level recursive signatures and proof aggregation.