Recently reviewed several governance proposals of Lista, and all the votes passed, but looking at the voter participation rate... frankly, it's a bit embarrassing. A large amount of LISTA tokens are just sitting in wallets or exchanges, with no interest in the future direction of the protocol.

This isn't just a Lista issue, but it indeed reflects an early warning in governance—an "hollowing out" trend.

Think about it, if a few large holders or internal teams dominate decision-making for the long term, problems are likely to arise. Proposals become increasingly similar, forming small circle mentalities, and true innovation and risk blind spots are ignored. What's more painful is that ordinary token holders start to see LISTA merely as a tradable asset, rather than a credential to exercise governance rights. As a result, community cohesion weakens, and eventually everyone just wants to leave.

What is the most dangerous scenario? When a major crisis or disagreement occurs—such as adjusting liquidation profit-sharing ratios or modifying key risk parameters—a decision lacking broad consensus can quickly cause community splits, and in severe cases, even hard forks.

How to solve this? Lista needs to redesign its incentive mechanism. Instead of simply rewarding votes with tokens, think about how to make governance participation "profitable" or "unignorable." For example, directly link a portion of the protocol's core revenue (liquidation fee shares, trading fee dividends) to the governance participation level of token holders. In months when proposal approval rates are low, reduce the revenue distribution—making non-voting participants see the cost.

Ultimately, active governance is the watershed that determines whether the protocol can evolve from a tool product into an ecosystem.